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In 1974 Britain elected a Labour government pledged to expand public spending 
significantly. Labour followed its programme for two years, but after that began to cut 
both government spending and taxation, anticipating the post-1979 Conservative 
agenda. This paper examines the history of this government, using it as a test-case for 
various ‘New Right’ economic and political theories that suggest that government 
expansion eventually hits structural limits. Such theoretical accounts prove 
unsatisfactory. By contrast, several short-term factors seem to have played an 
important constraining role. But an examination of the political thinking within the 
1970s Labour Party suggests that autonomous ideological changes were the most 
crucial determinant of the policy reversal.  
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This paper is a revised version of an Economic History thesis submitted to the London 
School of Economics in September 2000. 
 
The main text assumes analytical rather than chronological form, and, to avoid 
breaking the flow of the argument, it refers to persons, Labour Party structures and 
Britain’s macro-economy without offering introductions. To avoid assuming 
knowledge an appendix is added which briefly details the following: chronology; the 
jobs of individuals mentioned; the levels of inflation and unemployment; and, the 
structure and purpose of the Labour Party committees cited in the paper. This should 
be referred to whenever the main text seems presumptuous.  
 
The text also uses a few political and economic abbreviations. These are spelled out 
on the next page rather than in the body of the main text.    v 
Abbreviations 
CSO  Central Statistical Office 
DHSS Department of Health and Social Security 
GDP   Gross Domestic Product 
GGE  General Government Expenditure 
GGR   General Government Revenue 
HPC  Home Policy Committee [of Labour’s NEC] 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
NEB   National Enterprise Board 
NEC   National Executive Committee [of the Labour Party] 
NEDC National Economic Development Council 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
ONS  Office for National Statistics 
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PSBR  Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
TGWU Transport and General Workers’ Union 
TUC  Trades Union Congress  
VAT Value  Added  Tax  1 
1: Introduction 
 
Acting mainly through the Budget, although with the aid of other instruments, 
government can exert any influence it likes on income distribution, and can also 
determine, within broad limits, the division of total output between consumption, 




One of the realisations of the 1970s was that unduly extended states are weak states: 




During the 1970s free-market views began to prevail over Croslandite optimism about 
the state’s capability. The intellectual rise of the New Right was concurrent with 
developments in policy. Skidelsky sees 1970s governments worldwide as having been 
forced into retreat, having reached the limits of their powers. Since the late Nineteenth 
Century expectations of economic policy’s potential had tended to increase. By 1960, 
it was near-consensual that an appropriately activist state could (and should) 
redistribute, create jobs, provide services and increase productivity. The ‘overreach’ 
thesis sees this as having been misplaced. Too much was being asked of government, 
so it tried to affect too many outcomes while controlling none effectively: 
expectations of the state needed to diminish and more market outcomes be accepted.  
 
This study looks at the origins of ‘rolling back the state’ in Britain. 
 
 
1.1 ‘Tax-and-Spend’ and Social Democracy 
 
In Britain ‘social-democratic’ sometimes refers to the views of the Labour Right (and,  
after 1981, the SDP), regardless of intellectual content. But this paper consistently 
defines ‘social democracy’ in an historically-specific way – as the doctrines of writers 
like Crosland and, on the other side of the Atlantic, Galbraith. This social-democratic 
approach dominated the post-war programmes of progressive Western parties. It 
aimed, like the Left as a whole, at greater equality. Its distinctiveness lay in the means 
advanced: Keynesianism and a gradually growing state. The 1970s certainly saw 
Keynesianism challenged – by floating exchange-rates and OPEC-induced 
‘stagflation’. But the focus here is on the other component: the big state. 
 
Social democracy did not aim towards a state of a specific target size, and certainly 
not at a totally centralised economy – indeed, an aversion to this end separated it from 
the Far Left. But in practice the social-democratic programme centred on the state 
providing steadily more: the belief that the state was unduly extended was thus 
incompatible with it. 
 
Partly, this ‘statism’ reflected the presumption that those things that the state 
increasingly provided – health, education, housing, etc. – were intrinsically especially 
                                                 
1 Crosland, C. A. R., The Future of Socialism (Jonathan Cape, 1956), p27 
2 Skidelsky, R., The World After Communism (Papermac, 1995), p121   2 
worthwhile, what economists call ‘merit goods’. Galbraith warned the Left against 
being “co-conspirators with the conservative in reducing taxes”, even where they 
were regressive.
3 Revenues were needed to redress the “bizarre contrast” between the 
satiation of the often frivolous and artificially generated wants of private consumption 
and the “poverty which afflicts our public services”, making any tax cut a mistake.
4 
 
But partly, high tax-and-spend was seen as the route to equality. The big state was 
egalitarian in two ways. First, tax and transfer-spending tended to be progressive, so 
increasing the operation’s scale was typically redistributive. Secondly, and more 
subtly, increasing the share of national income consumed by state services 
redistributed power. The private-sector was controlled through market purchases, 
where each pound had equal weight, leaving influence dependent on spending power. 
In contrast, the state was theoretically controlled by elections, where each vote was 
equal.  
 
This introductory discussion suggests that tax-and-spend can be characterised as 
social-democratic, in my historically specific sense, when it follows two trends. First, 
its overall scale increases. Secondly, progressive redistribution increases. 
 
 
1.2 The British Case 
 
1970s Britain is an especially interesting case of social democracy’s demise for 
several reasons. First, it began under a Labour government originally pledged to 
heavy spending and redistribution.
5 An account seeing state contraction as the 
inevitable product of long-term political or economic constraints, rather than of 
‘political will’, might thus seem especially feasible. Secondly, British experience was 
early so it foreshadowed “what was to happen with variations throughout social-
democratic Europe in the course of the 1980s”.
6 Left governments in Germany (pre-
1982), France (from 1984), Greece and Spain would all retreat from social democracy 
along the path first beaten by Britain’s 1974–79 government. Finally, Labour was 
succeeded by a Conservative government that survived almost two decades, and 
pursued anti-social-democratic policies far more determinedly than its European 
counterparts. Thus the original breaking of social-democratic trends seems an 





The first histories of the mid-1970s represented the period as ending the post-war 
consensus and paving the way for Thatcherism. But their overwhelming concern was 
macroeconomic policy. For example, Holmes wrote: 
 
                                                 
3 Galbraith, J. K., The Affluent Society (Middlesex: Penguin, 2
nd ed., 1969), p251. The book was 
originally published in 1958, just two years after Crosland’s.  
4 Ibid, p247. 
5 Let Us Work Together – Labour’s Way Out of the Crisis (The Labour Party, 1974a) 
6 Thompson, W., The Left in History (Pluto Press, 1997), p148   3 
“The change in attitudes and ideologies after 1976 was possibly the most 
profound in…British politics since that engendered by the 1945–51 Labour 
Government… In specific terms, the post-1976 change of approach saw 




It is unsurprising that Keynesianism’s demise was the initial focus. The government 
appeared to have undergone a major macroeconomic conversion, as Callaghan’s 
famous announcement of the death of “the cosy world…where full-employment 
would be guaranteed by a stroke of a chancellor’s pen” showed.
8 These issues also 
created Labour’s most bitter internal disputes.
9 Finally, from the vantage of the 1980s, 
the Conservatives’ tolerance of 3 million unemployed represented easily the biggest 
break with the post-war world.  
 
But 25 years on, this does not seem the period’s enduring legacy. Unemployment, for 
now at least, is tending back to 1960s levels, and macro-policy has been far from 
consistently monetarist. Even in the 1980s monetary targeting was abandoned, and in 
the 1991-92 recession the automatic stabilisers were allowed to run their course, 
suggesting that reports of Keynesianism’s death had been exaggerated. Further, later 
studies of the 1974-79 Labour government have stressed how distinct its macro-
framework remained from that of early Thatcherism, principally because of the 
continuing centrality of incomes policy.
10 Most decisively, an authoritative work on 
the IMF crisis concluded that many of the changes earlier perceived in the mid-1970s 
were illusory: 
 
“economic policy in the last years of the Labour government differed little 
from what it had been before the arrival of the IMF.”
11 
 
So, current historiography fails to find the mid-1970s the watershed it was earlier 
proclaimed to be. The narrow focus on macro-policy might be responsible. For while 
macro-policy has since been volatile, the New Right’s aversion to high tax-and-spend 
dominated British policy through the 1980s and 1990s. This dominance was re-
affirmed in 1997 when Labour finally returned to power: it followed tight 
Conservative spending plans for two years, even though these implied a substantial 
shrinking of the state’s share of the economy.  
 
Exceptionally, Mullard has examined the long-run significance of 1974-79 for public 
spending. His conclusions are striking: 1974-79 was indeed a “watershed” generating 
“an alternative discourse of public expenditure” which transformed it from “healer of 
                                                 
7 Holmes, M., The Labour Government, 1974-79 (Macmillan, 1985), p182. Another 1980s political 
history viewing the period in the same light is: Kavanagh, D. and Morris, P., Consensus Politics: from 
Attlee to Thatcher, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989). An economist offers similar analysis in: Smith, D., The 
Rise and Fall of Monetarism (Pelican, 1987).  
8 Speech to 1976 Labour Conference. Cited in: Callaghan, J., Time and Chance (Collins, 1987), p414 
9 The 1976 Labour Conference resolved the government’s economic policy “has failed” and urged it 
should now instead “reflate the economy”. 
10 Allsopp, C., “Fiscal Policy”, in Artis, M. and Cobham, D. (ed.), Labour’s Economic Policies, 1974-
79 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), pp19-37 
11 Burk, K. & Cairncross, A., Goodbye Great Britain (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1992), p228   4 
the nation” to economic “villain”.
12 But he analyses only spending: tax is excluded. 
Thus in explaining the mid-1970s cuts he is still chiefly concerned with the 
macroeconomic question: why did the government close the public deficit?  
 
But it is possible to distinguish a separate question. Given that the deficit was to be 
closed, why did a social-democratic government chose to use spending cuts rather 
than tax rises? The state overreach hypothesis implies the explanation might lie in the 
force of long-term constraints. But no-one seems to have asked whether this is valid, 
nor to have examined the debates by which a notionally Left-wing party arrived at the 
decision. This gap in the literature is my starting point. 
 
 
1.4 The Rest of the Paper 
 
Before outlining the paper, it is useful to stress what it excludes. First, the 
macroeconomic fiscal stance (i.e. the size of the PSBR) is ignored. Macro-variables, 
like inflation, are considered only insofar as they are may have been affected 
asymmetrically by tax rises as against spending cuts. Secondly, there is no attempt to 
evaluate public service output. My question is whether Labour was either constrained 
to accept or autonomously desired lower spending; i.e. less public-sector input. 
Important questions about whether public spending was becoming less effective and 
whether this influenced the government are distinct. 
 
Chapter 2 shows how the mid-1970s broke social-democratic trends in tax-and-spend. 
The following two chapters examine the role of exogenous pressures on the 
government. Chapter 3 appraises economic arguments suggesting tax-and-spend 
needed to be cut, and Chapter 4 uses opinion polls to ask whether the public’s tax-
intolerance effectively implied an electoral constraint. Aside from the ‘objective’ 
importance of these constraints, both chapters also look at the role they played in 
Labour’s internal debate. Chapter 5 analyses this debate further, but moves the focus 
onto Labour’s changing ideas, establishing that parts of the party ceased to support 
high tax-and-spend, whilst others ceased to defend it. Chapter 6 concludes. 
 
The main primary research is in analysis of the debate. Unfortunately, Cabinet papers 
remain unavailable under the thirty-year rule. But extensive use has been made of 
minutes of internal Labour committees, which seem to have been little used and 
which represent an obvious substitute in that a ten-year confidentiality rule applies. 
These have the advantage of revealing opinion in the broader Labour Movement 
(unions and party) as well as in the government. Interviews are also a key primary 
source. Finally, the many published diaries and memoirs have been employed. 
                                                 
12 Mullard, M., The Politics of Public Expenditure (Croon Helm, 1987), pp149-50.    5 
2: Were the Mid-70s a Turning Point? 
 
 
Section 1.1 suggested social-democratic fiscal policy exhibited two trends: overall 
growth in tax-and-spend, and increasing redistribution. This chapter aims to show the 
mid-1970s were a watershed that broke both. Turning points in aggregates will be 
related to changes in parameters that politicians directly controlled, to suggest 




2.1 The Size of the State 
 
Before examining the evolution of public spending, a methodological issue must be 
cleared up. Public spending trends can be importantly affected by the relative price 
effect – the tendency for costs, especially unit-labour-costs, to grow faster in the 
public sector because its service-dominated activities have less capacity for 
productivity growth than the rest of the economy. Consequently, if spending is 
assessed in volume terms (i.e. in constant, rather than current, prices) its growth 
appears slower.
13 But for my purposes the current-prices measure is most relevant, as 
this determines the required tax burden. So, most series will be calculated on a current 
basis. 
  
Overall, the Twentieth Century saw huge growth in the state’s share in the economy.
14 
Both World Wars saw unprecedented government resource-mobilisation. A ‘ratchet’ 
or “displacement effect” has been seen in government’s subsequent failure to retreat 
to its peacetime role.
15 Indeed, after the second demobilisation, the state continued 
growing. By the 1970s this growth seemed automatic and irreversible. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows government income (GGR, roughly equalling the ‘tax burden’) and 
spending (GGE) in GDP, 1950-2000. On the spending side, the mid-1970s are a clear 
long-run turning point. Before 1975, apart from contraction in the mid-1950s (caused 
by the post-1953 Korean War demobilisation) GGE trended upwards, from 32.4% of 
GDP in 1956 to peak at 49.3% in 1975, with growth being especially rapid in 
Labour’s first year, 1974-75. Since then, despite fluctuations, it has trended down, to 
below 40% in the late 1990s. The short-run path followed by GGR under Labour was 
similar. The year to 1975 saw the tax burden expand from 35.4% to 40.3%, the 
biggest annual increase shown. Immediately afterwards GGR fell back, to 37.6% by 
1978.  
 
                                                 
13 For discussion of how the relative price effect affects measurement of British spending trends, see 
Hatton, T. J. and Chrystal, K. A., “The Budget and Fiscal Policy”, in Crafts, N. F. R. and Woodward, 
N. (ed.), The British Economy Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp52–62. 
14 For trends in Blue Book aggregates over the whole Twentieth Century, see Dilnot, A., and 
Emmerson, C., “The Economic Environment”, in Halsey, A. H., and Webb , J. (ed.), Twentieth Century 
British Social Trends (Macmillan, 2000), pp324-57. 
15 The second term dates from: Peacock, A. and Wiseman, J., The Growth of Public Expenditure in the 
UK (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).   6 
Still, there might seem to be two problems with viewing the mid-1970s as a long-term 
turning point, although neither is decisive. First, Heath’s early 1970s tax cuts had 
already interrupted the tax-burden’s 1955-70 growth. But these tax cuts were not 
matched in spending reductions, so were unsustainable and thus cannot represent a 
long-term turning point. In contrast, 1975-78 was the significant break with post-war 
tax trends, as reductions after 1975 were more than matched by lower spending. 
 
Secondly, that ‘rolling back the state’ began in the mid-1970s is obscured by the 
increase in both series in the early 1980s – indeed, the tax-burden only reached its 
long-run peak in 1982. But these developments reflected macro-economic 
performance and policy, not structural levels of tax-and-spend: recession depressed 
the denominator, unemployment boosted GGE and fiscal orthodoxy meant tax was 
increased commensurately. Once recovery began, in 1982, it gradually become clear 
that GGE and GGR had contracted structurally in the economy since the 1970s. And 
although the early 1990s recession again interrupted the state’s contraction, even 3 
million unemployed left GGE below earlier heights.   
 





























Another time-series that illustrates the mid-1970s break is absolute, real public 
spending. This requires constant prices, so the relative price effect may have a 
bearing. Figure 2.2 shows the natural log of total public spending. Two points stand 
out. First, 1975-77 is the only recent period to have witnessed substantial reductions 
in spending. This is because, unlike in later periods when public expenditure’s GDP 
share shrunk, in the mid-1970s GDP itself was stagnant. Secondly, the mid-1970s 







                                                 
16 Pre-1965 figures calculated from: Feinstein, C. H., Statistical Tables of National Income, 
Expenditure and Output for the UK, 1855-1965 (Macmillan, 1976). 1965-95 figures calculated from: 
CSO, National Income and Expenditure: The Blue Book (HMSO, various years). 1995-2000: GGR 
figures calculated from HM Treasury, Financial Statement and Budget Report (The Stationery Office, 
various years); GGE taken from ONS website. Post-1998 figures provisional.   7 





































Between 1974 and 1979, then, Labour presided over first acceleration,  and then 
reversal of the post-war trend for rapid state growth. Figure 2.3 links this to planned 
spending policy. It shows spending totals in annual Expenditure White Papers, one 
line being drawn for each Paper shown: for years earlier than each Paper’s 
publication, the totals are recorded outturns; for years after publication, they represent 
government plans. Thus the line representing the 1979 White Paper simply records 
the actual path of spending up until 1978/79, whereas the line for the 1975 White 
Paper represents spending plans for each year. 
 
The 1975 White Paper planned for continuous growth. 1976 marks a decisive break: 
its White Paper budgeted for unprecedented cuts. This might partly reflect the unduly 
pessimistic 1976 forecasts, which suggested that 1975/76 spending would exceed the 
1975 plans. This implied cuts were required if the planned path was to be returned to. 
But the huge cuts budgeted for right through to 1979/80 represented huge over-
compensation if this was the only aim. Further, if reversion to 1975 plans was 
intended, spending should have readjusted upwards when outturns revealed (in 1977) 
that 1976 projections had been unduly pessimistic, substantially over-estimating 
spending. But subsequent White Papers are shown to have stuck roughly to the 1976 
strategy. So long-term plans changed in 1976. 
 
Two other points are interesting. First, cuts were bigger than planned. This is seen in 
the outturn 1979 figures, which show spending consistently fell below planed levels. 
Nonetheless, policy was important in planning the direction of change, even if it did 
not control the magnitude. Secondly, the decisive policy change preceded the 1976 
Sterling and IMF crises. The crucial 1976 White Paper was published in February, but 
pressure on the pound began only in March 1976. The 1977 White Paper, published 
immediately after the final IMF crisis, did not radically alter the 1976 plans: the 
average level of spending planned for the years 1977/78 and 1978/79 was very similar 






                                                 
17 Pre-1965 from Feinstein (1976); post-1965 from CSO (various years).   8 



























































'75 '76 '77 '79
 
 
One feature of the cuts had special significance for the future size of the state – their 
heavy bearing on government investment. Retrenchment commonly hits investment, 
as its reduction lacks the short-run consequences of cutting current services. But large 
and sustained investment cuts are significant as they reveal changes in the path of 
overall future spending the government envisages: a decision to build one less 
hospital now implies less future current-consumption, as it will no longer be 
necessary to provide it with staff. Figure 2.4 charts government investment since 
1955.
19 Its relative size increased until the mid-1960s, and then fluctuated at 4% - 5% 
till 1976. It then fell sharply till 1982, since when it has been around 1.5% - 2%. 
Labour oversaw the major part of the contraction: from 4.7% in 1975 to 2.7% in 1978. 
So in a very direct way, cuts to investment in the 1970s paved the way for the overall 
shrinking of the state in the economy in later years. 
 


































On the tax side, as well, various indicators suggest 1975/76 divides a period of statism 
from one of cuts. The detail of tax policy is analysed in Section 2.2, but it is worth 
linking the decline of the tax-burden with policy-controlled parameters that 
                                                 
18 Collated from White Papers by Mullard (1987), table 5.1, p152. 
19 Figures are for local authority and central government investment. Following OECD practice, 
investment by the nationalised industries is excluded. 
20 Pre-1965 from Feinstein (1976); Post-1965 from CSO (various years).   9 
determined revenue from the two most significant types of tax – income tax and 
expenditure taxes.  
 
The most important determinants of income tax revenue are the basic rate and the 
personal allowance. By mid-1975, Labour had increased the basic rate by 5% to 35%. 
But by 1978 they had reduced it to 33%.
21 Likewise, Labour initially ran down the 
personal allowance’s real value from £3952 to £2906 (1997 prices). But from 1976 it 
increased, reaching £3225 by 1977.
22  
 
The initial eagerness to raise revenue is evident in the introduction of higher-rate 
(25%) VAT on luxury goods in November 1974. The subsequent tax-cutting policy is 
equally clear in its halving (to 12.5%) in April 1976.
23 The late 1970s reluctance to 
increase tax is also clear in low excise duties. Petrol and tobacco yield most excise 
revenue, yet total real tax on both (ad valorem and specific components) was lower in 
Labour’s last full year than at any time since the early 1960s.
24 The implication is that 
had Labour wished to pursue higher tax (ignoring, for now, distributional effects) 
historical precedent suggested excises offered ample room. 
 
Overall, there is strong evidence that long-term trends in the volume of tax and 





The second social-democratic fiscal trend is increasing progressive redistribution. 
Egalitarian policy involves altering the incidence of tax across the population, by 
increasing reliance on tariffs that relate to ability to pay, like income tax, and reducing 
that on those that ignore financial circumstance. It also involves setting the schedules 
of individual taxes (rates, bands, and the tax base) so more of the burden falls on the 
better-off. Additionally, spending policy may have a role, through increasing the 
relative weight of expenditure that disproportionately benefits the poor – notably cash 
benefits, and some direct provision, like housing.  
 
Figure 2.5 shows the Gini coefficient – a measure of income inequality – from 1961 
until the late 1990s. 1977 is revealed as a turning point, when a short period of 
declining inequality ended, and an upward trend began which has continued ever 
since. Other measures of income inequality also reveal the mid-1970s as a turning 
point.
25 This seems suggestive of Labour having abandoned redistributive policies. 
But policy is only one determinant of inequality – wages, employment and 
demographics are all crucial. So, to confirm that changing patterns of tax-and-spend 
helped underpin this change we need to examine the latter more directly.  
 
                                                 
21 HM Treasury, “The Treasury Tax and Benefit Reference Manual” (unpublished internal document, 
1995), Table 1.5. 
22 Calculation based on: average earnings (from ONS website), and HM Treasury (1995), Table 1.5. 
23 HM Treasury (1995), Table 2.1. 
24 HM Treasury (1995), Table 2.7. 
25 Pre-1979 figures from: Goodman, A. and Webb, S., For Richer, For Poorer, Commentary no.42 
(Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1994). Post-1979 from: Clark, T. and Taylor, J., “Income inequality: a tale 
of two cycles?”, Fiscal Studies, Vol. 20, No.4 (1999), pp 387-408.   10 






























Figure 2.6 charts the share of government revenue coming from income tax and 
expenditure taxes. From the late 1960s expenditure taxes was substituted for a greater 
reliance on income tax. Whereas in 1964 income tax revenue exceeded expenditure 
taxes by a mere 5%, by 1975 it raised two-thirds more revenue. In Labour’s first two 
years this social-democratic trend was accelerated, but then it moved into reverse. 
From 1976, the relative importance of income tax waned sharply. Since 1979 this 
trend has been extended so that by the 1990s expenditure taxes revenues exceeded 
income tax. The income tax cuts discussed in section 2.1 were largely responsible for 
this move from progressive types of tax after 1976.  
 























Income Tax Expenditure Taxes
 
 
Increasing reliance on regressive taxes was coupled to the cessation of attempts to 
make individual taxes more progressive. income tax can be made more progressive in 
two main ways – increases in the rates applied to higher incomes; and, reductions in 
the higher-rate threshold (cuts to the higher-rate threshold imposed a flat-rate levy on 
all those with incomes above it). 
  
In Labour’s first years both policies were followed. In 1973/74 there were eight 
higher-rates. By mid-1975, all but the top had increased by 5 percentage points, so 
                                                 
26 References as in footnote 25. Data derived from Family Resources and Family Expenditure Surveys. 
Income is net, and before deduction of housing costs. Incomes are adjusted for family size.  
27 Pre-1965 from Feinstein (1976); Post-1965 from CSO (various years).   11 
that they ranged from 45% to 75%. The top rate had increased by 8 points to 83%.
28 
But after 1976 no increases were made. Figure 2.7 shows how the higher-rate 
threshold fell from 249% of average earnings in 1973 to just 145% in 1976. This was 
mostly due to the effect of inflation, but also reflected a £500 higher-rate threshold cut 
in Healey’s first budget. After 1976, the higher-rate threshold increased substantially, 
to 178% of average earnings in 1978. 
 



































In reform of National Insurance Contributions, too, Labour initially increased 
progressivity. It helped the lowest-paid, by removing completely their (previously 
substantial) burden in 1975.
30 But again, progressive change ceased in 1975.  
 
A final indicator of changing tax progressivity is variation in the total burden across 
the earnings distribution. Figure 2.8 charts average direct tax-rates (income tax and 
National Insurance) at different fractions of average-earnings for a single person. It 
shows that Labour’s first two years effected a progressive increase in the spread. For 
example, the gap between the burden at average and twice-average earnings stood at 
1.5 percentage points in 1973, but by 1976 was 3.8 points. Afterwards, this gap again 
closed, to 2.4 points in 1978. After 1975 the spread of average rates between the 
lowest (50% average) and highest-paid (200%) also declined – from a peak of 10.8 to 













                                                 
28 HM Treasury (1995), Table 1.10. 
29 Calculation based on average earnings (from ONS website), and HM Treasury (1995), Table 1.10. 
30 HM Treasury (1995), pp3.7-3.9.   12 



































Overall, in Labour’s early years, it not only raised taxes, but did so in a progressive 
manner. In later years, when making tax cuts, it delivered these regressively. 
Equivalent definitive analysis of the distributional effects of spending is impossible – 
contentious assumptions would be needed. But Blue Book data suggests Labour’s 
post-1976 cuts policy was not implemented in a consistently egalitarian manner.
32  
 
On the one hand, the share of social security in total public spending grew, from 19% 
in 1975 to 25% in 1978, which might suggest egalitarianism. One Labour policy, was 
important in this – the pensions earnings ratchet. In 1974, the government passed 
legislation committing itself to increase pensions with the highest of price- or wage-
inflation. As Labour never repealed this, its effects continued even as cuts were 
embarked on – as late as 1979/80 real pensions increased substantially.
33 And this 




But the DHSS budget reflected more than policy: it was largely ‘entitlement-driven’, 
rising automatically with the aging population and increasing unemployment. Indeed, 
its continued to expand rapidly after 1979, in spite of explicitly Rightist policies. And 
cuts in discretionary spending seem to have been delivered less social-democratically. 
Social welfare programmes that most disproportionately benefited the worst-off were 
hit hard – for example, housing dwindled from 12.0% of spending in 1974, to just 
8.3% in 1979. Yet at the same time certain non social-democratic programmes 
actually gained relative ground: defence increased its share from 11.0% in 1974 to 
11.8% by 1978. This is further evidence, then, that Labour’s later years saw the 
abandonment of social-democratic policy. 
                                                 
31 Ibid, Table 13.6d. 
32 Compiled in Mullard (1987), Table 5.2. 
33 HM Treasury (1995), Table 13.3. 
34 Goodman, A., Johnson, P. & Webb, S., Inequality in the UK (Oxford: Oxford University Press,  
1997).   13 
3: The Role of Economic Constraints 
 
 
Labour, then, accelerated the long-term social-democratic thrust of fiscal policy for 
two years before forcing it into reverse. This requires explanation. One possibility is 
that the economic limits of social democracy had been reached. Such constraints 
could have been structural, in which case they did indeed represent long-run limits. 
Or, they could have been transient – meaning only that extending welfare and 
redistribution was ruled out in the particular economic climate of the time.  
 
This chapter analyses four economic arguments suggesting that tax-and-spend might 
go too far. In turn, each is outlined before its ‘objective’ bearing on 1970s Britain is 
evaluated. Finally, its weight in Labour’s internal debate is considered. 
 
 




In the Sunday Times, economists Bacon and Eltis publicised the argument that  
Britain’s long-term problems reflected public high spending.
35 Resource crowding-out 
was the responsible mechanism.
36 Government spending denied resources to the 
sales-financed ‘market-sector’ which ultimately funded non-market activity through 
tax. Powerful unions offset high tax with wage-demands, leaving squeezed profits and 
depressed market-sector investment (and ultimately output) the counterpart to high 
state spending. Britain was impoverished because productivity growth was fastest in 
the market-sector. High public spending might be ultimately unsustainable because 
the revenue from particular tax-rates declined with market-sector output. Finally, as 




Bacon and Eltis pointed to a few striking statistics to back their case. In particular, 
they contrasted the contraction of ‘market’ employment, with state expansion: for 
example, local government service manpower had grown 70% since the early 1960s.
37 
Average real-net-pay had increased just 14% from 1964 to 1974, while the direct tax 
paid by the supposedly typical family had increased nearly 100%.  
 
But there were serious weaknesses. First, the possibility that cutting government staff 
would produce unemployment instead of manufacturing jobs was not seriously 
considered. Yet experience in the late 1970s and 1980s – when the public-sector staff 
stopped expanding and unemployment soared – suggests this scenario is the more 
credible. Secondly, the evidence is selective. Exclusive focus on take-home pay to 
                                                 
35 The first of the three articles was: Bacon. R., and Eltis, W., “Too few producers: the drift Healey 
must stop”, Sunday Times, 14
th November 1975. Later expanded into a book: Bacon. R., and Eltis, W., 
Britain’s economic problems: too few producers (Macmillan, 1976).  
36 This must be distinguished from ‘financial crowding-out’, which reflects high government borrowing 
and can be attacked by tax rises as well as by spending cuts. 
37 Bacon and Eltis (1976), pp11-12.   14 
gauge living standards meant benefit-dependent groups, like the jobless and the 
retired, were simply excluded from the analysis. And ‘ominous’ figures on the state’s 
growth in GNP, are misleading, because much of the growth reflected transfer 
payments that cannot produce resource crowding-out.  
 
Most decisively, market-sector investment did not fall, as Figure 3.1 shows. In the 
decade from 1964-74 overall – public and private – market-sector investment, rose 
from 15.4% to 17.7% of GDP.
38 Even if the private sector is considered alone the 
fraction increased from 11.3% to 13.8%. And the 1975 recession did not produce a 
major departure from this long-run trend. 
 









































Whatever its merits, did the Bacon and Eltis thesis influence the policy turnaround? 
Not, it seems, through the thinking of the Treasury itself. Its head at the time recalls:  
 
“We studied, and were unimpressed by the piece…[it] seemed to us far too 
simplistic. We believed that you had to look in a much more microscopic way 
at the options than adopt a broad-brush view like that.” 
 
He believed that Treasury ministers were also “not very impressed” and certainly did 
not “recast their policies because of [the thesis]”.
40  
 
But Healey did deploy the argument to push the acceptance of cuts. He told ministers: 
 
“‘there was severe imbalance’ in the economy… We have got to close the 
Balance of Payments gap by 1978… We couldn’t go on diverting manpower 
from productive industry at this rate.”
41 
 
In public statements, too, the argument was deployed. For example the minor cuts of 
early 1975 were advanced on the grounds that: “the paramount need to move 
                                                 
38 Public corporations were, even for Bacon and Eltis, ‘market-sector’ as chiefly funded by sales. 
39 Post-1965 figures: CSO (various years); pre-1965 figures: Feinstein (1976). 
40 Interview: Sir Douglas Wass. 
41 Castle, B., The Castle Diaries, 1964-76 (Macmillan: London, 1990), p633, 14
th July 1975.   15 
resources into exports and investment make it essential to contain the demand on 
resources made by public expenditure.”
42 
 
But the argument that resources were a constraint lost credibility, as unemployment 
rose from mid-1975. Healey’s demands for cuts met effective reply in July 1976 when 
Benn argued: “the idea that you have got to make room [for investment] is simply not 
credible” given the unemployment.
43 The Chancellor thus played it down in the next 
cuts debate.
44 By late 1976, it was shelved completely: Rodgers, who was only in 
cabinet for the last cuts debate, does not recall the argument being discussed at all.
45  
 
The supposed ‘resource constraint’ was not influential in the Cabinet decision to 
accept cuts. But the thesis had a role in persuading the Labour Party beyond 
government to accept cuts. Soon after the Sunday Times article, the Labour Office 
argued new growth would permit little new spending as resources were needed for 
investment and the trade-balance.
46 The HPC was not immediately persuaded, making 
“a number of sharp criticisms” of their report and rejecting it.
47  But the basic 
argument survived into a later office document which the HPC approved. State 
resources, it stated, would be “especially limited in the two years between now [1976] 








Tax rises increased inflation in two ways. Indirect taxes directly increased prices, 
while direct tax generated cost-push inflation by increasing wage-demands. Generally 
the argument concerns the possibility that tax rises might worsen an (existing) 
inflationary spiral in the short-term. But Bacon and Eltis went further and argued that 
the long-term growth of tax-and-spend in Britain substantially underlay the increase 
in its inflation since the end of the 1950s. The effect was especially potent because of 
powerful unions. But the root problem was with tax, not the unions: excessive tax led 
moderate men to elect militant union leaders who would push for big wage increases, 





The view that the long-term growth of the state explained 1970s inflation is extremely 
weak. The state had grown hugely from 1900, but inflation trended up only from the 
1960s. And even in the twenty years to 1975, the percentage of aggregate earnings 
represented by direct tax (not all of which actually fell on earnings) increased only 
                                                 
42 Public Expenditure, Cmnd 5879 (HMSO: London, 1975), p3; cited in Mullard (1987), p148. 
43 Benn, T., Against the Tide (Arrow, 1989), p589, 2
nd July 1976. 
44 Benn (1989), p591, 6
th July 1976. 
45 Interview: Lord Rodgers.  
46 NEC Box LXI. HPC: RE:409/Jan 1976; Costing Labour’s Programme. 
47 NEC Box LXI. HPC: 12
th January 1975.  
48 NEC Box LXII. HPC: RE:509/March 1976; The Economy and Public Spending. 
49 Bacon and Eltis (1976), pp6-8.   16 
from 20.6% to 24.5%.
50 The overall wage bill would have had to increase by just 
5.2% had workers been compensated 100%.
51 This would have required an annual 
increase of just 0.25% per year in wages, and an even lower increase in overall costs, 
clearly, a small fraction of price- or wage-inflation over the period.
52 Besides, the 
stagnant net-wages, which Bacon and Eltis highlighted, showed far less than 100% of 
extra tax was actually passed on. So inflation was not a permanent obstacle. 
 
But short-term tax effects cannot be easily dismissed. The negative effect of indirect 
tax increases was seen, for example, in 1979 when Thatcher’s government increased 
VAT from 8% to 15%. Inflation increased sharply, from 10.3% in May to 17.4% in 
November of 1979, in spite of tight macro-policies.
53 In the 1970s, the immediate 
effect would have been aggravated by TUC’s uncharacteristically militant opposition 
to even modest indirect tax hikes. For example, when, in 1975, Healey introduced 
luxury-rate VAT, the TUC argued unions could legitimately “compensate for living 
standards” that the decision imperilled.
54 Thus major indirect tax hikes would have 
had the second-round inflation effect of undermining the pay-policy. 
 
By contrast, direct tax rises had ambiguous short-run effect. They impacted negatively 
if passed on by employees. Even if direct tax was irrelevant to the long-term (1960-
75) inflationary trend, short-run effects might have been important: tax increases were 
concentrated in certain years, like 1974 and 1975, when they might have been 
important in wage-bargaining. Big increases in these two successive years made this 
more likely as unions would have learnt that defending living standards required 
attention to net wages. But against this, the effect of Labour’s ‘social contract’ must 
be considered: trade unionists would give “their free acknowledgement that they [had] 
other loyalties” than those to their own members in pay-bargaining, in return for 
redistribution and welfare.
55 Tax-and-spend would cut inflation as unionists would 
accept pay-moderation in return for social democracy. 
 
Did the positive or the negative effect prevail? Before July 1975, despite growing tax-
and-spend, pay exploded: increases in central government reached 40% in 1975’s 
second quarter.
56 But this is not decisive, as there was no clearly defined pay-policy, 
so even sympathetic unions pushed maximal claims to avoid being left behind in the 
wage-price spiral. And the TUC agreed a tight pay-policy immediately after big direct 
tax rises in July 1975: its operation coincided with inflation falling from its August 
1975 peak, 27.9%, to 12.9% in July 1976.  
 
Further, the union leaders consistently tried to negotiate wage-moderation for welfare. 
For example, discussing with Healey the “balance of reflation” for 1976, the TUC 
dismissed his focus on take-home pay and instead “pressed the Chancellor on a 
regular six-month interval between pension increases.”
57 Even after the 1976 Budget 
                                                 
50 Data: post-1965 : CSO (various years); pre-1965: Feinstein (1976). Calculation: aggregate earnings 
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51 (1 – 0.206) / (1 – 0.245) = 1.052. 
52 20th root of 1.052 = 1.0025. 
53 ONS website. 
54 NEC Box LX. Liaison Cttee: 21
st April 1975. 
55 “Britain will win with Labour” (The Labour Party, 1974b), pp242-43. 
56 Ormerod , P., “Incomes Policy”, in Artis, M. and Cobham, D. (ed.) Labour’s Economic Policies, 
1974-79 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), p59. 
57 NEC Box LXII. Liaison Cttee: 26
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showed Healey had abandoned tax-and-spend, unionists tried to link the pay-policy to 
social policy pledges.
58 Indeed, even in 1978 the TUC opposed “any question of 
putting the preponderant weight of fiscal-expansionary measures in the next few years 
into tax reductions rather than on the expenditure side.”
59 Further, they seemed 
genuinely tolerant of direct tax rises: those in the 1975 Budget were not criticised.
60 
 
But union leaders were increasingly apart from their members in their relative 
indifference to privately-financed consumption, as real-pay stagnated from 1975. In 
1977 Jack Jones told a journalist that “when he went round factories workers knew 
what was happening to prices and dividends and they simply shouted at him” for 
acquiescence in pay-policies.
61 In 1978 Jones retired, and TGWU members chose 
Moss Evans to succeed him, who stood as an anti-pay-policy candidate, being more 
concerned with net wages than pension increases. The gulf was confirmed in Winter 
1978/79, when pay-policy collapsed in a wave of unofficial strikes, which suggested 
ordinary workers did indeed put private wages first. 
 
General conclusions about the inflation effect of direct tax are tentative. Union leaders 
were willing to contain wages in return for social democracy, and they did this with 
some success in 1975-76. But after this time their influence waned as sustained 
negative net real-wage growth proved unacceptable to workers accustomed to annual 
rises. Econometric evidence bolsters this view. There was genuine success in 1975-
76, but later pay-polices were ineffective, changes in wage-inflation being fully 
explained by macro-factors, like unemployment.
62 Thus, after 1976 rising tax-and-




All ministerial factions agreed that inflation was central in setting tax-and-spend.
63 
But some believed it meant tax-cuts were needed, while others, like Castle, argued 
instead that the “concept of the ‘social wage’” would persuade unions “not to press 
excessive wage demands”, making social democracy the solution.
64 Initially, these 
views dominated. Even in early 1975, as wage-inflation peaked, Healey attempted 
genuine social-wage bargaining, telling the unions: “the amount he could increase 
expenditure would depend on the rate of inflation”, and so on pay.
65 And the 1975 
Budget showed deflation by tax rises was still preferred.  
 
A minority always dissented. Healey’s deputy found the 1975 Budget “disturbing” for 
tackling inflation only “from the angle of increased taxation”.
66 He doubted whether 
unionists spoke for their members and asked whether: 
 
                                                 
58 See, for example: NEC Box LXIII. Liaison Cttee: 24
th May 1976. 
59 NEC Box LXVIII. Liaison Cttee: 21
st Nov 1977. 
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61 Cole, J., As it seemed to me (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995), p176. 
62 See Ormerod (1990), which includes original tests and reviews other econometric work.  
63 Interviews: Lord Shore; Lord Rodgers; Lord Lipsey (recalling Crosland’s views).  
64 Castle, B., Fighting All the Way (Macmillan, 1993), p498 and pp606-07. 
65 NEC Box LIX. Liaison Cttee: 25
th February 1975. 
66 Dell, E., A Hard Pounding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p121. Throughout the memoir 
Dell’s ongoing concern with market opinion is clear.   18 
“the truth of the matter is that in asking for an increased social wage those 
who are doing so are not speaking for their members in giving [it] a higher 
priority than personal expenditure?” 
 
He warned it was likely that real-wage increases would soon reveal that the “people 
are setting different priorities”, and necessitate spending cuts to control inflation.
67 
 
By around the time of the 1975 Budget, Healey and some other ministers were 
converted to this view by the persistence of high inflation. When Healey first 
demanded substantial cuts, “wage-inflation” was his first argument for making them. 
In backing his demands, Jenkins particularly stressed the “wages issue”.
68 But this 
view still did not prevail and cuts were postponed. But in mid-1975 even the Left 
perceived the concern. Foot publicly acknowledged in June 1975: “Most of the 
pressure [on wages] for the past year or two has been from the rank and file.”
69 
 
By autumn 1975 Healey could use the argument with success in Cabinet to dismiss 
the alternative of tax increases: these would encourage workers to “bargain on post-
tax incomes”.
70 When the significant cuts were first announced, Healey argued to the 
unions that these were beneficial as they would allow lower tax. Thus in 1976 there 
were repeated bizarre exchanges where supposedly social-democratic ministers 
foisted increased net pay (through tax cuts) on unions whose support for tax-and-
spend made them reluctant to accept. For example, Healey told the unions: “The most 
important single thing that could be done to improve the social situation” was not 
social spending but “to raise tax thresholds”.
71 Again, he argued the pay-policy 
required he “compensate for a lower [pay-rise] limit through the tax system”.
72  
 
Inflation played a far lesser role in subsequent cuts debates: Callaghan gave five 
reasons to back the IMF cuts which did not include inflation.
73 Indeed, when inflation 
was mentioned it was by ministers opposed to cuts: Benn for example, suggested that 
cuts would lead the unions to argue: “if you bust your side of the Social Contract, then 
we’ll bust ours”. He claimed they would thus “go for big wage claims”.
74 Even 
though in December 1976 inflation was probably becoming a genuine reason for cuts, 
it was not felt to be so as (unlike in 1975) a successful wage-policy had operated for 
over a year, while the TUC continued to stress ‘social priorities’ over wages.  
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Marginal tax creates deadweight loss through the substitution effect. In practice, the 
concern of ‘supply-side’ economists has been that high tax-rates blunt incentive, and 
so reduce effort. An implication stressed by the New Right is that at high tax-rates 
further increases may cut revenue: the Laffer effect.
75 A 100% rate removes all 
incentive to supply the taxable good and so yields no revenue. Assuming revenue is a 
continuous function of the rate, then some rate below 100% is a genuine limit in that 
further increases would cut yield. Even if overall tax rises remained possible, Laffer 
effects could apply at the top rates of tax, leaving tax at the limits of its power to 
redistribute: further notionally progressive changes would cut revenue from richer 
families. A more characteristically social-democratic concern is the poverty trap: high 
effective marginal rates being imposed on the poor by the interaction of tax and the 




Empirically, the Laffer thesis seems inapplicable to the rates prevalent in most tax-
systems. Certainly, increases in the basic rate of income tax (whose 1970s peak was 
35%) would have yielded revenue. But the very top rates may have approached the 
limit. The Laffer effect has been found in Sweden, whose top-rates compared with 
1970s Britain.
76 And assuming the elasticity of labour-supply is fairly high (0.2), then 
an estimate of the Laffer limit would be 83%, precisely the top-rate on earned income 
from 1974 to 1979.
77  
 
Even so, the limits of tax-progressivity had not been reached. First, further higher-rate 
increases might have been possible. A 1968 study (when the top effective rate on 
earned-income was even higher, 96.25%)
78 found 70% of even the highest-paid 
reported no disincentives, and even those that did worked no fewer hours, calling into 
question the significance for revenue.
79 Secondly, even if increasing the top rate were 
not possible, increasing other higher-rates or cutting the higher-rate threshold 
remained so: both were progressive as only higher-rate taxpayers suffered. 
  
Even if the extreme Laffer case is irrelevant, concern that high marginal rates imposed 
inefficiency or threatened a fair return to effort might still have made the government 
reluctant to increase them. But even then, progressive tax rises were possible by 
expanding the tax base, most particularly to include income used to pay mortgages. 
Even after Labour’s 1974 reform, interest on mortgages up to a (generous) £25,000 
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was offset against tax.
80 The wealthy benefited disproportionately: they were more 
likely to have mortgages, had larger mortgages, and their relief was at a higher rate.  
 
The poverty trap was serious in the mid-1970s. The family income supplement to top-
up low earnings (introduced under Heath) was withdrawn at 50% of gross pay. Its 
effects were additional to other benefit tapers, income tax and National Insurance. So 
effective rates often exceeded 100%.
81 Labour’s early reduction of real allowances 
aggravated the problem, as more benefit recipients paid tax: in 1976/77 the weekly 
tax-allowance for a married man with two young children was below his long-term 
supplementary benefit eligibility.
82 This might have made tax cuts look attractive. But 
they were not a cost-effective solution, as reduced rates and higher thresholds also 
benefited richer families. More efficient would have been reform of benefits (for 
example, assessing means-tests on net instead of gross income, or reducing the taper-





Marginal rates featured little in the cabinet debates which turned the tide against tax-
and-spend in 1975 and 1976. Shore recalls such arguments did not “have much 
resonance”, while Rodgers cannot “remember any discussion [of marginal tax-rates] 
at all”.
83 This reflected the Treasury’s own disregard of the issue – officials doubted 
that unhappiness with high marginal-rates “translated into anything serious for the rest 
of the economy”, as the labour of the highly-paid was in fixed supply.
84  
 
Still, high marginal-rates were important in two ways. First, they contributed to the 
vague perception that tax had reached its limits. Although increases were possible 
without changing marginal rates, this was not obvious to non-Treasury ministers, 
leaving them less able to frame credible tax rises. Shore states: 
 
“we felt that there wasn’t much one could do if [direct tax rises were] really to 




Secondly, as an economist at Number 10 recalls, “incentives, marginal rates and so on 
were intellectual justification” for tax-cuts that were already preferred.
86 In particular, 
they helped win the Labour Movement’s acceptance of cuts. Concern with the poverty 
trap led the TUC to push for a lower starting tax-rate.
87 And union and Party concerns 
went beyond the bottom end: both approved a report that urged the adverse effects of 
high-marginal rates be reduced at all levels.
88 Indeed, the Party warned that Britain 
faced the “limits to the tolerable level of taxation…in terms of the marginal effect on 
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increases in earnings” and argued this necessitated selective spending cuts.
89 Concern 
for marginal rates thus weakened the Movement’s demands for higher tax-and-spend. 
 
 




In 1976, supporting the pound was essential. Exchange-rate theories imply this 
required altering market-expectations of macro-variables like inflation, the current 
account and interest rates.
90 In 1976 this meant a deflationary fiscal tightening.
91 But 
markets may have discriminated between means of closing the PSBR. If they believed 
in any of the mechanisms described in sections 3.1 to 3.3, they would have expected 
high tax-and-spend to worsen inflation or competitiveness, and so reduce Sterling’s 
equilibrium value. Deflationary tax rises would then have to have been bigger than 
spending cuts to effect the same improvement in Sterling. Even misguided market 
opinion would then represent an additional pressure specifically for cuts. In December 
1976 winning IMF, rather than market, confidence became the key. But in practice the 
IMF was concerned to win back market approval, and it may have ideologically 




Influential financial voices certainly argued against deflation by tax rises. The Wall 
Street Journal argued that only “by some mad twist of logic” could the 1975 Budget 
which raised “$3 billion in taxes on an economy already strangling on taxes” be called 
“brave”. And its attack was in a manner to undermine confidence in Sterling: 
 
“The British government is now so clearly headed towards a policy of total 
confiscation that anyone who has any wealth left is discounting furiously [sic] 
to get it out of the country.”
92  
 
But over 1975 as a whole depreciation was modest.
93 Indeed, in early 1976 the 
Treasury believed “a gentle depreciation was in order”.
94 So, pressure on Sterling did 
not necessitate the February 1976 cuts. But in March the pound’s great slide began, 
and from then on market-opinion did bear on tax-and-spend, as the deflationary July 
1976 mini-Budget showed. It matched spending cuts of £1 billion with National 
Insurance increases of a further £1 billion to try and hold the pound. The latter was 
arguably counter-productive, as these tax rises “only underlined, in the eyes of 
overseas opinion and the financial markets, the Government’s reluctance to cut public 
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92 Wall Street Journal, 29
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expenditure.”
95 At a minimum the efficacy of the deflation was reduced, and the 
pound failed to rally.  
 
International political opinion was also important, even from before the final cuts. 
Britain required IMF credit even in 1975, and in mid-1976 the US approved a BIS 
loan which was granted on the unusual condition of full repayment within six 
months.
96 They foresaw this would necessitate a conditional IMF loan: American 
Treasury Secretary Yeo admitted the US had “put up the money ‘for the bait’ – i.e. to 
hook the UK economy into IMF control”.
97 So, it seems there was a US agenda, and it 
is likely that this included tax-and-spend cuts. The major influences on American 
foreign economic policy were all Right-wingers who regarded Labour’s welfare 
policies as bankrupt. For example, Fed Chairman Burns described his approach to 
Britain as that of a “a Neanderthal conservative” who was “naturally suspicious of a 
Labour government”.
 98 And Yeo was “unimpressed” by the July measures, because 
“Britain’s economic problems were not going to be solved by higher taxes”.
99 
 
Although negotiation for the final loan was formally with the IMF, in practice 
American influence remained central, as at the IMF “predominant power was from 
the outset exercised by the US”, its chief shareholder and geographical host.
100 
Pliatzky, a mandarin involved in the negotiations, recalled the IMF’s formal position:  
 
“It was conceded that it was for the British government to choose between the 
different ways of reducing the PSBR, but expenditure reduction would have a 
better effect than tax increases on financial opinion and on the economy.”
101 
 
Thus if the official position is taken at face value, deflationary tax increases were 
possible but were considered less effective, and so presumably would have had to 




Healey recalls that in “1974 the Treasury…believed that exchange rates were mainly 
determined by a country’s rate of inflation and balance of payments”, but that soon 
afterwards it was realised they “depended largely on the economic fashions of the 
time”.
102 One such ‘fashion’ was market distaste for the big state. Until mid-1976, the 
Treasury felt such market views “low on the agenda” in planning the method of 
deflation, and “in early 1976…the market reaction was not sufficiently evaluated”, 
which encouraged the (ineffective) National Insurance increase in July 1976. Adverse 
market reaction to this meant that attitudes changed, and “market factors did loom 
larger in the choice” between tax rises and spending cuts, so that by December 1976 
confidence was a clear reason to prefer cuts.
103  
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Once IMF confidence was the immediate issue, Callaghan clearly perceived the 
political dimension: Britain could hope to secure better terms by threatening 
isolationism in trade and defence. He put great energy into international negotiation, 
stressing to President Ford that better terms were needed to avoid calling “into 
question Britain’s role as an Alliance partner”.
104 But reports of his dealings with 
Schmidt, Ford and IMF-director Witteveen all suggest his negotiations centred on the 




Within Cabinet, views differed about whether international confidence was a serious 
constraint. For Right-wingers, like Rodgers, confidence was the central economic 
reason to favour cuts over tax rises.
106 The Left , in contrast, saw it as something “we 
would have taken for granted”, a problem to work around, not one to dictate policy.
107 
Indeed, the Left’s aim was to evade the confidence constraint by exchange-controls. 
But as pressure on the pound intensified, more came to see it as a binding constraint. 
Thus Crosland, who in late 1975 urged ministers not to be “too timid to resist talk of 
the pound and international confidence”, and had resisted the argument even in July 
1976, was by the time of the IMF crisis admitting that: “The only serious argument 
for cuts was one in terms of international confidence”.
108 
  
The Movement never saw confidence as a constraint. The Party tended to believe that 
creditors who looked unkindly on its policy should be informed that they were wrong. 
Thus Hart received rapturous reception when she told Conference that: 
 
“If Jim and Denis are worried about foreign confidence and the run on the 
pound, let them tell the IMF that we don’t agree with the pre-Keynesian 
economics that dominate the IMF.”
109 
 
The Party’s indifference to market-opinion was very clear in its repeated insistence 
that the fiscal stance be assessed on a revised basis so that nationalisation had no 
bearing – the market’s inevitable objection to this view was simply not considered.
110 
Indeed, in December 1976 it became clear that asset transfers did affect confidence 
when a large part of the ‘fiscal tightening’ that saved the pound was delivered by asset 
sale.
111 Yet the Party retained its preferred methodology as late as 1978.
112 This 
dogged refusal to contemplate market reaction to fiscal policy ruled it out as an 
argument to win the Party over to cuts in tax-and-spend.  
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The supposed structural limits on extending social democracy in the 1970s – resource 
crowding-out, equilibrium inflation and marginal tax-rates – were unimportant, both 
‘objectively’ and in their influence on policy. They were, however, important in 
rationalising decisions already taken, and in winning the Movement over to lower 
tax-and-spend. Constraints specific to the macroeconomic environment – confidence 
and the inflationary spiral – were genuinely important. They also weighed with 
Cabinet – especially inflation in the autumn 1975 debates, and ‘confidence’ in 
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4: Public Opinion 
 
Electoral pressure might have motivated the government to abandon social democracy 
even if it remained economically viable. A global ‘tax revolt’ in the 1970s and 1980s 
has indeed been described – cited in its support are the 1978 Californian referendum 
which legally capped tax-rates, and the worldwide success of tax-cutting politicians, 
like Reagan and Thatcher in the succeeding few years.
113 This chapter argues that 
there was reason to expect anti-social-democratic opinion in 1970s Britain. It then 
assesses evidence for it, and asks whether the government was influenced by the 
perception that the public mood had changed.  
 
 
4.1 Were Electoral Constraints to be Expected? 
 
‘The Crisis of Consumption’ 
 
The real counterpart of expanding government in the long-term was squeezed 
privately-financed consumption (not, as Bacon and Eltis feared, investment). Figure 
4.1 shows its fall from 67.5% to 58.9% of GDP over 1955-76. Subsequently, as the 
state contracted, the consumption-share grew, returning to mid-1960s levels in the 
1990s. The long-term reduction in the share of national income consumed might be 
expected to have provoked tax resistance. 
 







































After 1974 stagnant national income exacerbated the implications of consumption’s 
longstanding relative squeeze. The combined result was cumulative falls in real 
personal incomes of 4.0% and of 2.6% in consumption spending in Labour’s first four 
years, as Table 4.1 shows. The assumption of growing prosperity would have 
heightened the political impact: incomes and consumption had hitherto increased 
every year since 1952, bar a minor decline in consumption in 1965.
 115 In these 
circumstances support for lower tax-and-spend to allow higher consumption seems 
highly feasible. 
                                                 
113 Kay, J. & King, M., The British Tax System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 5
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Table 4.1 – Real Incomes and Spending under Labour
116 
 
Year  Real disposable income 
(1975 £ billion) 
Real consumers’ 
expenditure 
(1975 £ billion) 
1973 75.3 66.3 
1974 74.2 65.1 
1975 73.9 64.7 
1976 73.4 64.8 
1977 72.3 64.6 
1978 78.4 68.2 
1979 83.7 71.4 
 
Support for Redistribution 
 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) argue low (gross-income) inequality makes redistribution 
less likely. The median self-interested voter supports less redistribution with lower 
inequality, providing (as typically) mean-income exceeds the median.
117 Assuming 
the median-voter hypothesis – that vote-maximising governments follow the 
preferences of the median voter on the ideological spectrum – then less redistribution 
follows.
118 Figure 2.5 showed 1977 saw inequality at a record low. This largely 
reflected gross-incomes.
119 Thus Alesina and Rodrik imply public opinion may have 




4.2 Opinion Poll Evidence 
 
Before 1978 pollsters tested support for tax-and-spend only occasionally. Table 4.2 
offers two ‘snapshots’ taken in each of three different eras. Systematic bias is possible 
(e.g. if social pressures leave respondents exaggerating their willingness to pay tax), 
so how reported attitudes ‘cash-in’ in voting terms is unclear. Nonetheless change 
over time is significant, and the late 1970s saw opinion unusually anti-statist: only a 
minority backed tax-financed spending increases, whereas in both the later and earlier 
period this was the majority view. Regular results since 1978 suggest that 1979 itself 
was the turning point: by 1981 the majority for spending increases returned, it has 
since trended upwards and been continuous.
120 
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Table 4.2 – The Preferred Balance between Tax and Spending
121 



















(a) - (b) - (c) 
High post-war consensus 
Jan 1959  13% 9% 78%  +  56% 
May 1960  28% 5% 67%  +  34% 
Late 1970s 
Oct 1978  29% 26% 45%  -  10% 
May 1979  37% 26% 37%  -  26% 
Post-Thatcher 
July 1993  8% 15%  75%  +  52% 
Feb 1995  8% 16%  69%  +  45% 
 
Table 4.3 shows attitudes to redistribution across elections. The first and third 
questions concern spending on the needy, and their contrasting absolute results show 
the importance of question-framing. But again, it is trends that matter, and over 1974-
79 there was anti-egalitarian movement. The majority against higher benefits rose 11 
percentage-points, while the fraction believing benefits were already excessive 
increased sharply, to 50%. The majority for anti-poverty spending also dropped, by 7 
points. But by 1983 both trends were in reverse: most notably support for the view 
that current benefits were excessive fell 16 points. So, it seems the mid-1970s saw a 
transitory low-point in support for redistribution, rather than representing a permanent 
sea-change against it. 
 
Even this conclusion is diluted by the table’s second question. Support for general 
“redistribution” did not decline significantly over 1974-79: change was negative, but 
the pro-redistribution majority dropped only 2 points, within the poll’s (95% level) 
margin of error, and in 1979, 51% still favoured redistribution. Thus claims that the 
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Table 4.3: Support for Redistributive Policies
122 











(a) - (b) - (c) 
Govt Spending to get rid of poverty 
Oct 1974  87% 6%  7%  +74% 
May 1979  84% 8%  9%  +67% 
May 1983  86% 3% 11%  +72% 
Redistribution of Income and Wealth 
Oct 1974  56% 16% 28%  +12% 
May 1979  55% 17% 28%  +10% 
May 1983  48% 15% 37% -4% 
Welfare benefits now… 







Oct 1974  23% 43% 34% -54% 
May 1979  17% 32% 50% -65% 
May 1983  29% 51% 20% -42% 
 
We have tentatively established that opinion moved against social democracy in the 
years approaching the late 1970s. But a more detailed picture of change over time is 
needed before its significance is known. In particular, did public opinion change 
precede policy changes, or did the public follow the government’s lead? And, how 
determined and consistent were the changes? 
 
After each Budget pollsters ask whether it was “fair”. Budgets whose fiscal stance 
allowed an overall giveaway are likely to be judged fairer, but a long-run upward 
trend towards viewing budgets as “unfair” should be expected if the country was 
coming to think its tax burden excessive. Figure 4.2, however, shows there was no 
such trend. This casts doubt on the idea the public was growing consistently more tax-
resistant in years to the mid-1970s.  
 
Neither do responses to individual Budgets suggest strong anti-statism. Labour’s early 
tax increases were deemed fair by most voters – the 1974 Budget was endorsed more 
strongly even than the tax-cutting giveaway 1973 Budget. 1975’s tax rises were less 
popular, but the modest slippage can be explained by the tighter fiscal stance in 1975, 
and it still commanded majority support. Reaction to the later tax-cutting Budgets was 
mixed: 1976 and 1978 were well received, but in 1977 a clear majority judged a tax-
cutting Budget unfair. These inconsistent results suggest the public lacked a clearly-
defined view on tax-and-spend, but condemned the 1977 Budget as the government 
was generally unpopular (see below). Finally, the suggestion that the public had come 
to oppose progressive redistribution is challenged by the hostile reception to Howe’s 
regressive 1979 budget. 
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s Fair Not Fair
 
 
A party’s support reflects public attitudes to a range of its policies, and also its 
perceived general competence. But as Thatcher campaigned so forthrightly to cut tax-
and-spend from 1975 onwards, if opinion shifted strongly against statism, then 
persistent growth in Conservative support might be expected. Figure 4.3 shows 
voting-intentions over the government’s life. A 3-month moving average is used as 
the raw figures’ (+/-3%) margin of error produces illusory volatility.  
 
The path to the 1979 Conservative victory suggests opinion on tax-and-spend was 
unimportant. As late as September 1976, the parties’ standing was equal. So, Labour’s 
early decisions to cut tax-and-spend preceded its unpopularity. Only as the IMF crisis 
broke did Conservative support grow strongly. This probably reflected the currency 
crisis’s erosion of perceived government competence: Wilson and Major’s 
governments (respectively in 1967 and 1992) suffered comparable collapses after 
Sterling crises.
124 Further, the swing reversed in 1977: the parties were again equal in 
mid-1978. If radical tax-and-spend cuts were sought, voters would surely have backed 
the Conservatives more consistently. Finally, timing of the decisive pro-Tory swing 
again suggests perceived competence rather than ideology was responsible: it 
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Overall, as expected, late 1970s opinion seems to have been unusually anti-social-
democratic, but its significance for policy is questionable. First, there is no evidence 
of a persistent sea-change, so insofar as it represented a limit on social democracy it 
was so only in a short-term sense: it cannot explain the long-run policy reversals since 
the 1970s. Secondly, it cannot fully rationalise even the mid-1970s cuts, as 
government unpopularity onset only after these had started. Finally, if voting 
behaviour reflected complex interaction between parties and electors, rather than 
simple rational choice, government unpopularity could have caused anti-social-
democratic sentiment rather than the reverse. Psychologically, cognitive dissonance 
might have led individuals to adopt anti-social-democratic views after they had 
converted to the Conservatives for other, non-ideological reasons.
126 Voters may have 
‘bought into’ Tory anti-statist rhetoric rather than live with the discomfort of opposing 
it when they in any case intended to support the Party.  
 
Even though it seems unlikely that shifting opinion initially enforced policy-reversals, 
once opinion moved it would have been an additional pressure against social 
democracy in the government’s last years. 
 
 
4.3 Government Perceptions 
 
Healey told colleagues he was “The most political Chancellor you’ve ever had”, and 
he certainly does seem to have been motivated to abandon tax-and-spend by electoral 
considerations.
127 In Cabinet he repeatedly demanded cuts on this basis. He argued 
publishing figures to show the public the value of their welfare provision would leave 
them “shocked, not pleased, when they saw how much we were spending on the 
social services”: they already “felt too much of our national resources were going on 
the public services”.
128 He claimed the February 1976 cuts would be popular, telling 
Cabinet: 
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“At the Labour clubs you’ll find there’s an awful lot of support for this policy 
of cutting public expenditure. They will all tell you about Paddy Murphy up 
the street who’s got eighteen children, has not worked for years, lives on 




Other Right-wing ministers shared Healey’s belief that cuts were politically attractive. 
Callaghan argued for the IMF cuts because they would allow tax reductions and “in 
this we can expect wide public support”.
130 Likewise, Rodgers recalls fear of the 
electoral consequences of tax rises as being (along with confidence) the most 
important reason for choosing cuts as the means to deflate.
131 
 
The waning of the government’s interest in redistribution was also partly politically 
motivated. Callaghan’s advisor recalls that the post-1976 decision to cut income tax 
rates, rather than cutting tax more progressively through higher allowances, was 
political: 
 
“I remember…trying to explain this to the Prime Minister [the advantages of 
increasing allowances]. And he was being more obtuse about it than his 
mental equipment made likely. And I have no doubt why, he didn’t want to 
believe that that was effective as there were more votes and headlines in 
income tax-rates as people didn’t understand thresholds.”
132 
 
Even Crosland, social democracy’s high-priest, was influenced by the view that: 
 
“you could not afford to put all your eggs in the public expenditure basket – 
because that did not deliver a reasonable level of real increase in living 
standards for working people and you wouldn’t win elections.”
133 
 
But perceptions of this ‘electoral constraint’ varied hugely with ministers’ own 
ideological orientation: the Left was sceptical. Benn doubted the voters that Healey 
caricatured would vote Labour in any circumstances.
134 Even where statist ministers 
felt tax-and-spend cuts would be popular, they refused to believe this should dictate 
policy. Shore emphatically insists that the electoral effect of taxing middle-income 
families “wouldn’t have worried us”.
135 While Crosland saw that a swing to the Right 
made cuts politically easier than in the 1960s, he did not conclude this made them 
attractive or necessary.
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4.4 Conclusions 
 
In the late 1970s voters’ attitudes were atypically anti-social-democratic, but the 
delayed and inconsistent nature of the evolution of these views calls into question 
their power as a constraint. Within government, the Right certainly believed that the 
public was demanding tax-and-spend cuts, but its ability to affect cabinet decisions 
was weakened because other factions interpreted opinion differently, and in any case 
believed in holding firm.   33 
5: Ideational Developments 
 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 suggested the important pressures against state expansion in the late 
1970s were short-term – they cannot explain why, as Chapter 2 showed, social-
democratic trends were enduringly broken. The significance of the 1974-79 reversals 
thus crucially depends on whether exogenous pressures alone explain them. If so, the 
endurance of anti-social-democratic policies since then reflects the Conservatives’ 
1979-97 dominance. But if instead the reversal was partly an act of Labour will, the 
late 1970s have more significance, as even without Mrs Thatcher, ideational changes 
might have forced social democracy into long-term retreat. 
 
This chapter assesses the role played by the autonomous evolution of Labour thinking 
in the policy reversals. It maps out the unfavourable intellectual context social 
democracy faced in mid-1970s before tracing the evolution of thought within 
Labour’s various factions.  
 
 
5.1 Context: Social Democracy Under Pressure  
 
‘Butskellist’ 1950s policy made social democracy – demand-management and 
expanding welfare – near-consensual.
137 This reflected perceived success as the 
economy outperformed interwar precedent. But by 1960, awareness developed that 
Britain’s growth lagged its competitors’.
138 Butskellism’s problems strained social-
democratic self confidence: Crosland warned he had earlier been “too optimistic 
…about the performance of Anglo-Saxon economies”.
139 Yet in practice the initial 
response was to extend statism where Butskellism had remained laissez-faire. 1961 
saw the ‘pay pause’, which initiated government encroachment on wage-bargaining, 
and the founding of the NEDC, which signalled a new macroeconomic corporatism. 
Labour argued government should do still more, looking admiringly to continental 
indicative plans. In office from 1964, it announced a National Plan. As early as 1967, 
though, low growth made its failure transparent.  
 
At this point the debate started to polarise. On the Right, inflation encouraged 
Friedman and others to promote rediscovery of market virtues over Keynes. 
Simultaneously, American New Rightists invented ‘government failure’. Niskanen 
dismissed traditional ideas of public service and substituted the rent-seeking 
bureaucrat. His ‘budget-maximisation’ resembled profit-maximisation, but unlike 
private managers he lacked competition and so was wasteful. Thus built-in 
mechanisms of expansion left the state inefficiently over-sized.
140 These ideas had 
influence beyond the academy. The 1970 Conservative manifesto broke post-1945 
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precedent in being explicitly anti-social-democratic: “there has been too much 
government: there will be less”.
141 
 
Meanwhile, a socialist Left argued social democracy was flawed as capitalism would 
not sustain further incremental improvements without fundamental change. Holland 
argued multinationals undermined Keynesian and regulatory policies. State influence 
over employment, prices and investment would fail as managers escaped national 
control. Thus, “without public ownership of the means of production, distribution and 
exchange, the state will never manage the strategic features of the economy in the 
public interest.”
142 More generally the New Left argued declining profits signalled a 
Marxian crisis of capitalism, necessitating a choice between moving “forward to 
socialism or back to the market”. The Labour Left was heavily influenced, in 
particular believing compulsory industrial policies were required. These figured 
prominently in Labour’s (otherwise social-democratic) 1974 platform.
143  
 
During 1974–79, as social democracy struggled with stagflation, new political charges 
were levelled alongside economic criticism. The newly confident Right looked back 
to Hayek who had argued: 
 
“Once the communal…sector exceeds a certain fraction of the total the effects 
of its actions dominate the whole system.”
144  
 
He held such domination undermined liberty, the plural society and good government. 
In the mid-1970s the argument’s resonance strengthened as inaccurate official figures 
suggested that the state represented 60% of national income (the real figure was just 
above 45%).
145 Dell recalled the 60% figure as “one to strike horror into the most 
valiant social-democratic heart”.
146 It was certainly one to encourage Hayekian 
arguments about Britain.  
 
King held Britain risked ‘ungovernability’ as “the number of dependency 
relationships which the government is involved has increased substantially”, giving it 
an unmanageably vast remit.
147 Brittan argued the ‘electoral market’ generated 
excessive tax and borrowing. Parties were forced to outspend each other because 
information-costs denied voters a budget-constraint: public expenditure’s costs were 
obscured while its benefits were transparent.
148 Others argued from this supposed 
informational asymmetry that the big state was “politically bankrupt” – fully informed 
assent to its growth had never been given. Consequently, disillusioned citizens would 
no longer voluntarily co-operate with government, making more compulsion 
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necessary.





5.2 Healey, Callaghan and the Right  
 
In 1974 Labour was already an uneasy alliance. But the party gained cohesion from 
support of tax-and-spend. Even one of the most Right-wing ministers admits: 
    
“The party [of 1974] had, as one common objective, substantially enhanced 




By 1979 this had changed. Vast cuts had been made, yet Callaghan’s closest advisor 
judges that even if Number 10 had been free from exogenous pressure, “we wouldn’t 
have reversed the scale or direction of the cuts.”
152 More generally, Labour’s Right 
ceased to believe that Labour had necessarily “to spend more than our predecessors”: 
it had abandoned high tax-and-spend as an article of faith even for the long-run.
153  
 
The Right never desired spending growth as rapid as during 1974/75. This followed 
by default, first, because of the inevitable second 1974 election. Before this the 
Cabinet never strategically discussed spending.
154 Instead, new spending uncovered 
by tax was approved to secure victory. Secondly, in early 1975, winning a “yes” in the 
European referendum was the Right’s priority. Wilson’s ‘nightmare’ was that the 
referendum would destroy Labour by pitting leaders against the (largely anti-EEC) 
movement.
155 Avoiding this required a non-confrontational approach to spending 
(amongst other issues) before the vote: Wilson let the pro-spending majority prevail 
against Healey’s demands so that by mid-1975 Foot believed cuts were defeated.
156 
But immediately after the vote Wilson moved rapidly to exploit victory by preparing 
the ground for the autumn 1975 cuts debate.  
 
In early 1976 signs emerged that some Right-wingers aimed to do more than slow the 
growth of government to a ‘sensible’ rate: rather, they wanted less tax-and-spend. 
Jenkins’s Anglesey speech sounded Hayekian alarm at the (incorrect) figures putting 
public spending at 60% of GDP: 
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“I do not think that you can push public expenditure above 60% and maintain 
the values of a plural society with adequate freedom of choice. We are here 
close to one of the frontiers of social democracy.”
157  
 
Rodgers recalls that when Jenkins suggested “that even 50% was too high”, then “he 
spoke for us all [the future SDP] in that respect.”
158  
 
Over 1976, this ideational change became more widespread. In February 1976, Right-
wing ministers effectively argued the opposite of Galbraith to the unions: that social 
provision amounted to public affluence next to pressing private needs. Williams 
argued much public spending represented waste, while Mulley insisted education cuts 
were acceptable as employment was high in the sector.
159 Callaghan’s personal 
interventions, after his installation as PM in April 1976, show he saw privately-
financed consumption as priority. For example, he stalled the replacement of child tax 
allowances with child benefit which went straight to the mother as he was concerned 
about diverting resources from the pay-packet.
160  
 
In the IMF debates the extent and the depth of the Right’s conversion become clear. 
Some Right ministers, like Lever, initially criticised cuts as deflationary. But Healey 
only had to promise that any “overkill” on spending would enable tax cuts to dispose 
of this resistance, as these critics were indifferent to the level of tax-and-spend.
161 
Meanwhile, other Right-wingers positively welcomed the crisis as providing political 
cover for reducing tax-and-spend. Mason thought cabinet should make a virtue of its 
predicament and “rally round the tax cuts” that would follow. Morris preferred 
“generous” to “grudging” IMF approval as this would secure “lower taxes”.
 162  
 
Underlying the Right’s abandonment of statism was their rejection of what had earlier 
been its chief rationale, egalitarianism. Many favoured the higher inequality that 
would follow lower tax-and-spend. Morris, for example, hoped that tax cuts would 
extend beyond “our people” to: 
 
“Middle managers …[who] were ‘cabin’d, cribb’d and confin’d bound in’ by 
the present tax levels and the incomes policy squeeze.”
163  
 
Inegalitarianism also saw progressive tax rises opposed. Healey moved against 
Labour’s proposed wealth tax, which had symbolic importance in signalling that a 
bigger state should erode the privileges of wealth. In autumn 1975, Healey insisted he 
remained firmly committed.
164 Yet a year later he objected even to a working-group to 
consider it. He bemoaned the difficulty of a “workable scheme”, but as the working-
group was to examine just this problem, it seems likely that his objection was more 
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than practical.
165 Likewise, in 1977 Callaghan resisted proposals for gradual cuts to 
mortgage tax-relief for those at the top of the income distribution.
166 
 
The Right’s loss of enthusiasm for redistributive tax-and-spend was clear in their IMF 
crisis proposal for benefit cuts. Opinion moved rapidly on this. In allocating the July 
1976 cuts, Callaghan suggested to Cabinet (which made no recorded objection) that 
“we exclude making cuts in social security benefits.”
167 Yet in December 1976 he 
held up benefits being “reduced in a way that would be sensible” as a positive 
advantage of settling on the IMF’s terms.
168 Partly this reflected new concern with 
‘replacement-rates’ – the Right believed inequality between the lower-paid and the 
workless was insufficient to make work pay. Thus Williams argued for tax cuts bigger 
than macro-economically required to allow “for an increase in the income tax 
threshold” to redistribute in favour of those in work and recognise “concern about the 
relationship of short-term benefits to take-home pay.”
169  
 
Replacement-rates were only relevant to unemployment benefits, yet the Right also 
wanted to cut pensions, revealing more general inegalitarianism. The pensions 
‘earnings ratchet’ pledged continuous growth in spending on one key low-income 
group, making it the central social-democratic policy in the 1974 manifesto. Yet by 
late 1976 Healey argued that to guarantee higher pensions was wrong when “worker’s 
earnings were not protected”.
170 Callaghan agreed: pensioners had recently received a 
relative increase, “but that can’t go on on that basis”.
171 Yet the 1974 commitment 
was deliberately to continuous growth in the state’s redistributive operation on 
precisely this basis: opinion had certainly changed. 
 
Overall, the Right abandoned social democracy and replaced it with managerialism, 
rather than an alternative progressive ideology. In 1977, a journalist suggested to 
several ministers (mostly future SDP members, including Owen, Williams, Rodgers 
and Dell) that Labour now offered nothing more than a Conservative-style promise of 
competence. None resisted the suggestion. One admitted the passing of Croslandism 
but “confessed that a new philosophy was not available from the Labour revisionists. 
What distinguished Labour from the Conservatives he could best define as a 
‘feeling’.”
172 This neatly sums up the post-ideological position of the Labour Right in 
these years: it might now be called ‘Blairite’.  
 
 
5.3 The Left and the Extra-Parliamentary Party 
 
The Left identified itself by its support for the AES, rather than by its attitude to tax-
and-spend. The AES aimed chiefly at avoiding deflation, and so unemployment. It 
centred on (physical) import controls to remove the balance-of-payments constraint. 
These necessitated “rationing and allocation” of imports. Other steps to socialise the 
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economy were also envisaged: price-control; “control of banks and other financial 
institutions”; “work sharing arrangements”; and, more state industrial involvement.
173 
As the Left believed the AES would avoid the choice between tax rises and spending 
cuts, this was relegated to secondary status, and the faction exhibited inconsistent 
views on the matter.  
 
Left-leaning ministers included Foot, Shore and Benn.
174 In Cabinet, they did suggest 
tax rises were a lesser evil than spending cuts. For example, in autumn 1975, Benn 
urged the PSBR be partly reduced “by tax reliefs or tax changes”.
175 In December 
1976, Shore recognised the need for some deficit reduction, but felt “he would prefer 
taxation mainly”.
176 Yet this was secondary: Shore recalls his preference for tax over 
spending “was not central to my beliefs at the time, like the unemployment issue.”
177 
And Benn separated the Left, which felt the government “should have a different 
economic strategy”, from those who merely argued it “should raise taxation”.
178  
 
As tax-and-spend was not a central Left principle, when consumption bottomed out in 
1977 the Cabinet Left abandoned support for it in the short-term: Benn felt tax cuts 
temporarily “justifiable”.
179 Its secondary status also meant Benn could work closely 
with the increasingly Left-dominated extra-Parliamentary Party (hereafter ‘the 
Party’), even though it did not share his enthusiasm for higher tax-and-spend. The 
HPC represented the Party. It was chaired by Benn, but most of its members were 
senior Left figures outside government. From early 1975, the HPC commissioned 
reports explicitly to provide an “alternative to the conventional Treasury approach”.
180 
But on tax-and-spend the reports suggest the Party’s attitude was remarkably close to 
Healey’s. 
 
The Party actually turned against tax rises earlier than the Chancellor. In Spring 1975, 
Healey added 2% to the basic rate of tax, but as early as February, the HPC argued 
against policies that would take the basic-rate to “unprecedented levels”.
181 Its 
specific proposals for the 1975 Budget urged far smaller tax rises than the government 
implemented.
182 It also endorsed  spending cuts before the government – to avoid 
“unacceptable increases in taxation” which would mean “squeezing consumers’ 
expenditure intolerably hard”.
183 So, the mid-1970s Party did not prioritise public 
over privately-financed consumption. 
 
Once cuts began, the Party opposed them on macro-grounds, but on tax-and-spend 
remained cautious. The state’s growing GDP share implied there were “limits to the 
extent to which public expenditure can grow”, especially as “the benefits” of high 
spending had “not always been apparent”.
184 Again, while IMF conditions on trade 
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were bitterly resented, its fiscal demands were accepted: cuts to reduce “the share of 
national resources taken by public expenditure” were “past history”, and the Party 
“raise[d] no objection” to reducing the direct tax burden.
185  
 
Furthermore, in 1976 the Party came to recognise that “the real constraint on public 
expenditure” lay “in the tolerable limits of the tax burden”, and it highlighted how this 
recognition affected spending more severely than other arguments for cuts. First, it 
meant the need for cuts was structural, not cyclical. Secondly, it affected transfer 
spending, not just government consumption.
186 
 
Unlike the Right, the Left’s ambivalence to statism emerged alongside continued 
egalitarianism. The Left united against benefit cuts. Orme reminded Cabinet they 
involved attacking the poorest: “We talk about the people on benefits – what are they 
actually getting?… A married couple with two children gets £27 at present compared 
to the average wage of £70 per week.”
187 The Party, meanwhile, advanced only 
progressive cuts. Much spending, like higher education, was reducible as it was 
“scarcely progressive at all”. Indeed, rail subsides were so “regressive” that they 
judged: “it may well make sense to phase [them] out.” [Original emphasis].
188 And 
while opposing overall tax hikes through 1976, the HPC continued to demand 
progressive rises to finance reductions at the bottom end. In particular, it amended a 
report to insist on a £500 higher-rate threshold cut.
189 
 
In the specific circumstances of 1977, the Party’s concern for squeezed consumption 
meant that it abandoned demands even for progressive tax rises. High-income gainers 
from Party tax proposals were now judged unproblematic: “it would be a mistake to 
worry too much about the benefit of increased tax thresholds seeping through” even to 
the highest-paid because the pay-policy had already squeezed them.
190 Similarly, 
faced with proposals for progressive restrictions on mortgage-relief, most “Left wing 
ministers kept their mouths shut”.
191 But these were temporary changes, specific to 
1977. In 1978, the Party again stressed the importance of targeting tax cuts, explicitly 
opposing a basic rate cut which “would give the greatest benefit to those higher up the 
scale”.
192 So there had been no ideological conversion from egalitarianism.  
 
But overall, in spite of continued egalitarianism, the Left failed consistently to defend 
tax-and-spend. Left ministers abandoned it as a short-term strategy after 1976, while 
the Party ceased to favour it even for the long-term. The failure to prioritise social 
spending did not just reflect the short-term consumption squeeze, but also, and more 
fundamentally, the Left’s adoption of a non social-democratic viewpoint that saw 
welfare as secondary. 
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The focus was instead on the AES and industrial policy. Thus even when the Party 
proposed spending increases, the bulk was earmarked for the NEB and asset 
acquisition.
193 Likewise, Benn felt NSO revenue should be used to “reindustrialise”, 
not for welfare.
194 Industrial policy’s priority reflected many things – the Marxian 
perception that it alone could solve capitalism’s crisis; the ideological appeal of the 
extensive socialisation it implied; and, the belief that cutting unemployment was the 
key to defending the working-class. All this rendered welfare secondary, and anyone 
who prioritised it over the AES was mistrusted. When Castle suggested import-
controls were irrelevant to saving spending, Benn wrote: “Barbara thinks socialism is 
about the social wage”, which meant she would accept orthodox policies “if it would 
prevent public expenditure cuts in the DHSS”. He concluded “she’s not on our side at 




5.4 The Unions and the Social-Democratic Centre 
 
‘Social democrats’ are here classed as the residual group who consistently opposed 
cuts, but who opposed the AES or regarded it as secondary. They did not regard 
themselves as a group, as attitudes to non-spending issues and history divided them. 
Ten years earlier almost the whole Labour Party prioritised spending, so the diverse 
figures covered by this description – which included senior unionists (notably Jack 
Jones), Castle and Crosland – had different backgrounds in the party and different 
friends. This led to mutual mistrust. Crosland mistrusted the unions’ social-
democratic rhetoric believing “they did not deal with the question of priorities”.
196 
Castle thought that Crosland would “always toe the Treasury line…for all the 
oratorical gestures he likes to make.”
197 
 
Social democrats retained clear loyalty to the long-run goal of higher spending. 
Crosland for example, unlike the Right, remained clear that the eventual aim should 
be a return to steady public spending growth, which would probably have seen it grow 
further in GDP.
198 The TUC argued at the depth of the IMF crisis that “essential 
features of the movement’s programme” such as higher pensions should not be 
compromised because of a short-run crisis.
199  
 
This long-run aim produced shared alarm at the apparent philosophical shift which the 
Labour Right had undergone. Castle ordered researchers to: 
 
“draft an attack on [the] new Right-wing philosophy which…[was] spreading, 
not only in the Financial Times
  but among Right-wing members of the 
Cabinet [which saw cuts as] positively socially desirable.”
200  
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Crosland complained the Right had surrendered ideology to “pragmatism, empiricism, 
safety first”. They risked accepting “horrible”, “illiterate & reactionary attitude to 
public expenditure”.
201 Hattersley reacted so strongly to Jenkins’ claim that “60 
percent of national income devoted to public spending would lead to tyranny” that he 
severed a longstanding alliance with him.
202 TUC leaders felt similar unease. In 
rejecting the “dogmatic” anti-social-democratic arguments of the February 1976 
White Paper they warned that Labour must not move towards a “Tory conception” of 
tax-and-spend which emphasised only narrow “self-interest”.
203  
 
Underlying the social democrats’ continued statism was continued egalitarianism. 
Castle opposed tax cuts because her “whole social policy was based on the fact that 
relief through the tax system did not reach the poorest who most needed help.”
204 In 
December 1976 Crosland’s egalitarianism saw him join with the Left to oppose 
benefit cuts.
205 He continued to press for the state to do more redistribution, in spite of 
hard times: a 1976 speech argued that “fairer tax” was amongst priorities so urgent 
that they must “be pursued with even more determination when the going is hard.”
206  
 
This shared reaction meant that in spite of mutual mistrust, social democrats fought 
cuts together. In the autumn 1975 cuts debates, Gaitskell’s lieutenant, Crosland, found 
the Bevanite Castle “his strongest ally”.
207 They argued together that “it was wrong to 




But there were differences. Crosland accepted some short-term cuts as the largesse of 
the mid-1970s offended his gradualism. His advisor judges that:  
 
“the truth is that in [1974 and 1975] we did not have public spending growing 
at a Croslandite rate…we had public spending running out of control.”
 209 
 
This view lay behind his famous warning to local government that current spending 
growth was too fast – “the party’s over”, albeit, he hoped, only “for the time 
being”.
210 This gradualism ultimately made even the IMF cuts acceptable: they were 
not “a refutation of Croslandism” if seen as a short-run measure.
211 His chief concern 
in fighting cuts was thus to preserve demand (and so jobs), not to protect social 
spending: Keynesianism was integral to his approach, and he rejected inflation-
control through unemployment as unjust.
212 
 
Castle, in contrast, consistently supported higher tax-and-spend even in the short-run, 
as she sought rapid, rather than gradual, change. Plans merely to delay child benefit 
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produced such fury that official minutes record her as “very angry”.
213 Furthermore, 
unlike Crosland, her chief interest was increasing tax-and-spend, not demand. She 
fought all tax cuts arguing that: “Everyone knew that tax reliefs meant a loss of 
revenue for public expenditure.”
214 This opposition extended even, for example, to tax 
cuts targeted at pensioners.
215  
 
Castle’s attitude was shared by the TUC leadership. After 1975’s tax rises “the 
General Council recognise[d]” that the increase in the social wage that it approvingly 
calculated had necessarily “involve[d] increases in tax”. Yet it urged still further 
spending on “housing and pensions”.
216 The Chancellor’s argument that tax was too 
high was met with the reply that “other countries also had high, if not higher levels of 
taxation”.
217 Even in 1976, they demanded the pensions earnings ratchet be replaced 




But both Castle and the union leaders had declining influence. By 1976, as section 3.2 
showed, the TUC was judged apart from its members by ministers, reducing its 
influence. Castle, meanwhile, was sacked in April 1976. By the time of the final 1976 
cuts debate, the only determined social democrats in cabinet were Crosland and his 
protégé, Hattersley, and their opposition to short-run spending cuts was 
macroeconomic. Their alternative to the IMF cuts ultimately had two components. 
First, import deposits. Although effectively a tax (on imports), they were: 
 
“preferred not primarily as a tax increase, but as a way of reducing imports… 




Secondly, smaller deflation. Their proposal was for a “presentational job” to the IMF 
involving creative accounting (including re-announcement of old cuts) underpinned 
by a threat to impose a ‘siege economy’ which it was hoped would be sufficient to 
persuade the IMF to accept a smaller real PSBR reduction.
220  
 
Once this was rejected, and a substantial deflation settled on, social democrats did not 
argue with other ministers over the ‘deflationary balance’ between tax rises and 
spending cuts. Indeed, Crosland “hoped there would be tax remissions” to compensate 
for the cuts. Although he suggested that favourable conditions would “maybe even” 
allow some reversal of cuts, this resistance was token, as he also urged the forward 
announcement of tax cuts which meant effectively committing to redistribute the 
fruits of growth to the private-sector.
221 So, ultimately, the social democrats did not 
resist the short-run decision to cut tax-and-spend. 
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5.5 The Outcome 
 
Eventually, a Cabinet originally committed to expanding the state approved three 
major rounds of cuts without resignations. This chapter suggests this reflected more 
than respect of constraints. The Right had shifted ideologically. It had abandoned 
egalitarianism, which had been the chief rationale for statism. Further, it ceased to 
assume publicly-provided goods were a more pressing need than private consumption. 
Although half the Cabinet did not move ideologically with the Right, and did resist 
cuts, their defence of spending proved ineffective.  
 
The Left’s programme could never have won majority cabinet backing. Proposals for 
severe import restrictions were politically unacceptable as they breached EEC 
membership, which the public had recently resoundingly endorsed. More generally, 
the AES ruled out potential allies on spending. Crosland, for example, could never 
have embraced a strategy that he felt “essentially aimed at recreating” the “war-time 
planning apparatus”, when “the whole purpose of the Future of Socialism had been to 
demolish all that kind of thinking.”
222  
 
Social democrats suffered specific weaknesses in an increasingly bipolar debate. 
Britain’s recurrent mid-1970s crises combined with post-war disappointments to 
suggest a more drastic prescription was needed than Crosland’s, for “defensive battle 
to preserve post-war achievements against the rising threat of New Conservatism.”
223 
Labour’s centre was thus weakened, as the 1976 leadership election showed. 
Crosland’s bid to seek “common ground which unites both” Left and Right brought 
just 17 votes, whereas each of the other five candidates – all clearly identified with 
Left or Right – received at least 30.
224 In Cabinet, this same weakness left Hattersley 
as Crosland’s only loyal backer.  
 
More fundamentally, both groups’ opposition to cuts reflected a macroeconomic 
stance that seemed incredible. Both proposed that cuts be avoided with borrowing 
rather than tax, a position that signalled indifference to inflation, whose rates were 
high throughout 1975, and again rising during the IMF crisis. When, for example, 
Benn told Cabinet that “the [alternative] strategy involves a higher rate of inflation”, 
its rejection seems unsurprising given that its rate was already approaching 30%.
225 
Yet once reflation was rejected, no-one pushed hard for deflationary tax rises as a 
second-best, as these also threatened the unemployment whose avoidance both groups 
felt to be the top priority. Besides, social-democratic gradualism implied short-run 
restraint on tax after rapid rises in the mid-1970s, while many Left-wingers felt 
depressed private living standards were more pressing than public services. In the last, 
no-one pushed increases in tax to preserve short-run spending, and this allowed those 
who had abandoned tax-and-spend for long-term to prevail. 
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6: Conclusions 
 
Section 1.3 showed recent historiography has cast doubt on earlier claims that the 
1974-79 period was a watershed in economic policy. This paper restores the period to 
that status, but for new reasons: it began the reversal of post-war trends in tax-and-
spend. Labour was elected pledged to extend the state, and it did just that for 18 
months. Yet from 1976, tax-rates declined while spending was cut. This break with 
post-war trends anticipated Thatcherism.  
 
Interpretation of Labour’s reversal depends on why spending cuts were chosen over 
further tax rises. Short-term pressures were certainly important: inflation weighed 
heavily in 1975, as did ‘confidence’ in 1976. And towards the end of Labour’s term, 
the public mood certainly became anti-social-democratic, which encouraged the 
Government to further the retreat it was already embarked on. But the structural 
constraints that have been hypothesised – resource crowding-out and excessive 
marginal rates – have been shown to have had little objective bearing and little 
influence on government. Nor do polls suggests a decisive, prolonged anti-social-
democratic sea-change in public opinion. So the long-run limits of social democracy 
did not enforce prolonged reversal of post-war trends. Once political and 
macroeconomic difficulties had passed, social democracy could have been resumed. 
 
Still, that it was not depended on more than the election of Mrs Thatcher. Labour 
itself had undergone ideological changes. For a large part of the party the 
abandonment of social democracy was voluntary. Those still supporting higher 
spending did so ineffectually. Social democrats were weak in an increasingly bipolar 
debate, while the Left’s wholesale radical package was never likely to be 
implemented. But most decisively, ministers opposed to cuts advanced reflation – not 
higher tax – as the alternative. Once this was rejected, neither group was willing to 
push hard for tax rises. Even the party’s Centre-Left, then, temporarily lost 
enthusiasm for tax-and-spend. First, because it too felt that private consumption was 
already unacceptably depressed. Secondly, because employment was its chief 
concern, and tax rises threatened this as surely as spending cuts. The cessation of the 
growth of tax-and-spend, then, largely reflected Labour’s lack of will to defend it.  
 
This conclusion raises obvious questions for future research. Did breaks with social-
democratic trends in other countries reflect similar ideational changes? And, how did 
waning British support for tax-and-spend relate to the performance of 1970s public 
services?  
 
Our understanding of how the mid-1970s proved a watershed in fiscal policy might 
finally be taken as suggestive for the interpretation of contemporary events. The 
recent Comprehensive Spending Reviews saw a British government plan a prolonged 
increase in the public sector’s share in GDP for the first time since the mid-1970s. 
Could this represent the first signs of a new break in the history British tax-and-
spend? Might the social-democratic approach, alien to governments since the 1970s, 
be resurgent?    45 









th February,  
General election: Labour wins three more seats than the Conservatives 
 
4
th March,  
Harold Wilson forms a minority government  
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Run on pound begins; £1 < $2 for first time 
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5
th April  
  Callaghan replaces Wilson as PM 
 
6
th April  
Budget: pay-policy conditional income tax cuts; cash limits applied to 75% 




nd July  
Cabinet agrees and announces emergency fiscal tightening: £1 billion in 
National Insurance increases and £1 billion in spending cuts 
 
29
th September  
  Healey announces he is to apply for IMF credit 
 
23
rd November – 7
th December  
Series of Cabinets debate principle and detail of conditions attached to IMF 
application. Final decision is for significant spending cuts. 
 
15
th December  





th March  
Budget offers pay-policy conditional tax cuts including 2% reduction in the 





th April  





rd May  
  Conservatives win general election 




Includes all participants referred to in main text and interviewed. No dates are given  
where one post held 1974-79. 
 
Tony Benn: Industry Secretary, 1974-75; Energy Secretary, 1975-79 
 
James Callaghan: Foreign Secretary, 1974-76; PM, 1976-79 
 
Barbara Castle: Secretary for DHSS, 1974-76 
 
Tony Crosland: Environment Secretary, 1974-76; Foreign Secretary, 1976-77 
 
Edmund Dell: Paymaster General, 1974-76; Trade Secretary 1976-78 
 
Bernard Donoughue: Head of Number 10 Policy Unit. 
 
Michael Foot: Employment Secretary, 1974-76; Leader of the House, 1976-79 
 
Judith Hart: Minister for Overseas Development, 1974-75 and 1977-79 
 
Roy Hattersley: Junior Foreign Office Minister, 1974-76; Prices Secretary, 1976-79. 
 
Denis Healey: Chancellor 
 
Roy Jenkins: Home Secretary 1974-76 
 
Jack Jones: leader of the TGWU (until 1978) 
 
Harold Lever: Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 
 
David Lipsey: Advisor to Tony Crosland, 1974-77; Advisor to Number 10, 1977-79 
 
Roy Mason: Defence Secretary 1974-76; Northern Irish Secretary 1976-79 
 
John Morris: Welsh Secretary 
 
Fred Mulley: Transport Minister 1974-75; Secretary for Education 1975-76; for  
Defence 1976-79 
 
Stan Orme: Junior Minister Northern Ireland, 1974-76; DHSS Cabinet Minister,  
1974-79 
 
William Rodgers: Junior Defence Minister , 1974-76; Transport Secretary 1976-79 
 
Peter Shore: Trade Secretary 1974-76; Environment Secretary 1976-79 
 
Douglas Wass: Treasury Permanent Secretary 
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Shirley Williams: Prices Secretary 1974-76; Education Secretary 1976-79 
 
Harold Wilson: PM 1974-76 
 
 
III: The Macro-economy 
 
Figure A.1 shows the two most vital key macroeconomic variables under Labour. 
Unemployment is measured as the fraction of the Labour force claiming benefit. 
 

















































IV: Labour Party Committees
229 
Labour’s conference is theoretically the Party’s sovereign body, but as this could not 
practically run day-to-day affairs, the Movement elects the NEC to represent it, under 
Labour’s 1918 Constitution. The NEC’s composition reflected the party’s federal 
structure, with members from each of the Constituency Labour Parties, trade unions, 
socialist societies, and the women’s section. Reforms in 1931 and 1937 increased the 
weight and autonomy of Constituency Parties in determining NEC composition.  
 
Detailed NEC economic discussion issues took place in the HPC and its various sub-
committees. It is the minutes of these meetings that this paper looks to gauge Party 
opinion. 
 
In 1972 the TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee was established to co-ordinate the 
approach of unions and Party. It had equal membership from each of: the 
Parliamentary Party (typically senior ministers or shadow-ministers), the TUC and the 
Constituency section of the NEC. The minutes of this committee have also been 
extensively employed. 
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